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REVIEW ESSAY 
CONCERNING FRENCH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
MANUELS: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL 
FRENCH TEXTBOOKS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 1 
DOMINIQUE CARREAU,2 DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (Pedone, 8th ed. 2004). 
JEAN COMBACAU & SERGE SuR,3 DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (Montchrestien, 6th 
ed. 2004). 
EMMANUEL DECAUX,4 DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (Dalloz, 4th ed. 2004). 
PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY,5 DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (Dalloz, 7th ed. 2004). 
ALAIN PELLET & PA TRICK DAILLIER, 6 DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (L.G .D.J ., 7th ed. 
2002). 
Reviewed by Alix Toublanc• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The perspectives ofFrench lawyers concerning international law and international 
institutions are formed largely by the basic course in public international law that they 
took as law students. Students in the course attend formal lectures by the professor 
(cours magistraux) and often supplementary section meetings, or tutorials, with 
instructors ( travaux diriges ), as well as read all or part of a basic textbook ( manue/) in 
public international law and other assigned materials. 
One way to gain insight into the fundamental ways of thinking about international 
law of French lawyers and law-trained officials is to take a close look at the manuels 
that they studied as law students. Are these manuels narrow and technically focused, 
limiting inquiry to the text of treaties and other authoritative sources of international 
law? Or are they broad-ranging and policy-oriented, opening avenues to consideration 
• Maitre de conferences, l'Universite de Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne). 
I. The first difficulty in writing this article was selecting the textbooks to analyze. It was solved by 
using the two criteria of representation and diversity of perspective. The analysis was thus limited to those 
textbooks used most by students that also presented the personal views of the author or authors. Although 
other textbooks are not discussed, the ones that are should provide a representative overview of the diversity 
of French doctrine. 
2. Dominique Carreau is a professor at the Universite de Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne). 
3. Jean Combacau and Serge Sur ("Combacau-Sur'') are professors at the Universite de Paris II 
(Pantheon-Assas ). 
4. Emmanuel Decaux is a professor at the Universite de Paris II (Pantheon-Assas). 
S. Pierre-Marie Dupuy is a professor at the European University Institute and the Universite de Paris 
II (Pantheon-Assas). 
6. Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet ("Daillier-Pellet") are professors at the Universite de Paris 
(Nanterre). Alain Pellet is a member and former President of the United Nations International Law 
Commission. 
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of a wide variety of factors? Do they advocate and employ methods which privilege 
logical and deductive reasoning for arriving at solutions to legal problems? Or do they 
direct attention to analysis that looks also to the purpose of rules? Do they present 
international law from a policy-neutral perspective? Or do they engage in judgments 
about existing rules or suggest the development of new rules? Do they conceive 
international law as state-centered? Or do they see it rather from a "world community" 
perspective? These are some of the questions which will be addressed in this article. 
Presenting French textbooks to the American internationalist public logically leads 
one to try to explain how they differ from the casebooks used by American law 
students. 7 This, however, raises a further, implicit question: whether there is sufficient 
unity in French doctrine to justify a presentation of the underlying spirit of French 
textbooks as a whole. 
The first question is relatively easy to answer because there are clear differences 
in the form of French manuels and American casebooks: French textbooks are almost 
always smaller in size than American casebooks. The main reason is that, as a general 
rule, they do not include the documents and annexes which appear in abundance in 
American casebooks, i.e., sizeable extracts from case law and the writings of scholars. 
In France, these are simply quoted and summarized by the author of the textbook 
because these sorts of documents are more often provided in handouts distributed to 
students to prepare tutorials rather than directly included in the textbooks themselves. 8 
The second point appears more difficult to resolve: is there sufficient substantive 
unity between these textbooks to justify presenting them as a whole and developing 
''the" French concept of international law, which is probably what the American 
internationalist reading this review is hoping to find? Of course, there are many 
similarities, especially in the presentation of the subject in general. Each textbook 
commences with a more or less detailed study of the history of international law and 
a description of the various schools of thought. This is followed, although the order 
may vary, by a study of the relations between international and national law, sources, 
subjects, the application of international law in the international and national legal 
orders, the responsibility of states, the law of peace and international security, and the 
regime of international spaces, which is particularly developed in the Combacau-Sur 
textbook. However, the latter excludes economic questions relating to trade 
regulation, investment, and development law, whereas these matters are presented by 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy and amply developed in the Daillier-Pellet textbook. Combacau-
Sur, Daillier-Pellet, and Pierre-Marie Dupuy also analyze questions relating to 
environmental law. Human rights, another sensitive subject of contemporary inter-
7. For a critical review of the leading contemporary American international law casebooks, see David 
J. Bederman, International Law Casebooks: Tradition, Revision, and Pedagogy, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 200 
(2004) (book review). 
8. The exception to this rule is Emmanuel Decaux's textbook, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, which 
includes many extracts from case law and doctrine. French law students also have access to important 
documents, like the U .N. Charter, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, many U .N. General Assembly 
and Security Council Resolutions, etc. in PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY, LES GRANDS TEXTES DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (4th ed. 2004). In fact, Professor Dupuy indicates in the Preface to this work that 
it is cross-referenced to his manuel, and his manuel is cross-referenced to his collection of documents. In 
this sense it resembles a documentary supplement to an American casebook. 
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national law, is discussed in all the textbooks, but particularly well developed in those 
of Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Daillier-Pellet. 
Nevertheless, making a list of the subjects common to all the authors clearly does 
not allow us to determine whether there is any unity of doctrine: a "French concept" 
of international law. The way in which these subjects are treated will be the deter-
mining factor. It is the doctrinal conclusions drawn by their authors from case law and 
practice that will reveal any unity or important variations in the principal French public 
international law textbooks. 
In fact, there are two main sorts of variation in French textbooks. They first 
become evident at an early stage, when the authors define the object of study and the 
methodology. Part I of this article will therefore address the questions of definition 
and methodology. Differences among French textbooks also result from more sub-
stantive theoretical disagreements concerning the nature and meaning of international 
law. These disagreements relate to differing views with respect to objectivism 9 and 
voluntarism, 10 which will be addressed in Part II of this article. Thus, although it will 
not be possible to present American readers with a unitary French concept of inter-
national law, they may, at least, be impressed by the richness and diversity of French 
doctrine. 
II. PRELIMINARY PROBLEMS OF DEFINffiON AND SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 
The diversity of French doctrine is evident in the very first pages of the textbooks 
we are considering with their different definitions of international law. This is 
confirmed by varying conceptions of the appropriate scope of the study, although one 
should note the common concern of all authors to present the most neutral analysis 
possible. 
A. The Problem of Defining International Law 
The content of a textbook on international law logically depends, above all, on the 
definition of the subject to be studied that is chosen by the authors. As there is no 
objective definition of international law, one may prefer a more or less strict, or more 
or less classic definition extending from the law governing interstate relations to the 
law governing transnational phenomena more generally. Unsurprisingly, one finds a 
wide variety of definitions in French textbooks, from the most classic to the broadest, 
which exercise a decisive influence on the substantive content of the textbooks and the 
subjects studied. Although there is no real unity in French doctrine on this point, it is 
possible to observe a dominant tendency. 
The most restrained definition may be found in the textbook by Jean Combacau 
and Serge Sur: "Public international law is the law produced through relations between 
two or more States." 11 The classicism of this definition already foreshadows the 
9. Objectivism determines that the binding force oflaw is based on a reference to something outside 
will, outside the frame of Kelsenian formalism, on objective elements based on the nature of the society or 
on social needs which the State can only record. Positive law is considered as the more or less successful 
translation of objective law, which preexists and gives the binding force to positive law. 
I 0. Voluntarism determines that the binding force of international law is based on the consent of the 
subjects of law, especially the sovereign States. 
11. I JEAN COMBACAU & SERGE SUR, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 15 (Montchrestien, 6th ed. 2004) 
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consequences for questions such as the sources and subjects of international law. A 
wider definition is provided in Pierre-Marie Dupuy's textbook: "International law is 
composed of the whole range of rules and bodies intended to govern international 
society. " 12 A similar perspective can be found in the definition adopted by Alain Pellet 
and Patrick Daillier: "International law is defined as the law applicable to international 
society." 13 The implicit intention not to limit international law to a purely interstate 
phenomenon is patent in these definitions. Emmanuel Decaux states this intention 
explicitly: "International law is no longer interstate law, limited to relations between 
a closed club of States; it is the law of international society as a whole, governing a 
range of subjects whose transnational relations are constantly increasing." 14 
Dominique Carreau even considers that one can no longer use the term "public inter-
national law," as law defining relations between states, because this no longer 
corresponds to the state of contemporary international society. The author would 
prefer to adopt the position of Philip Jessup, asserting that we should now use the term 
''transnational law," i.e., "all law which regulates actions or events that transcend 
national borders." 15 This wide range of definitions, from the most Westphalian to the 
most contemporary, testifies to the great diversity of French doctrine. The conse-
quences of this diversity in definition are significant. 
The first group of definitions dictates a strictly limited field of study, excluding 
any study of international relations, private international law, or transnational law. 
Jean Combacau and Serge Sur thus consider that the "rules governing private trans-
state relations and rules of any origin that do not stem from the state legal order" do 
not come within the ambit of their study. 16 Alain Pellet and Patrick Daillier's textbook 
presents a less strictly interstate definition of international law, although they explicitly 
indicate that it excludes private international law and lex mercatoria. 11 Dominique 
Carreau's textbook counters this dominant tendency, stating that it will also "include 
those areas coming within the French conception of private international law, such as 
international contracts and the relations between States and individuals." 18 Accord-
ingly, the author covers the question of agreements between non-state authorities: 9 
Emmanuel Decaux 's textbook stands out for its inclusion of ''the forces and limits 
of law in the 21st century world, including issues relating to globalization and 
American unilateralism, the instrumentalization of international justice and the 
challenges ofterrorism." 20 This approach is both wider and more political. It is less 
strictly technical, and the frontier with international relations is less marked. Thus, 
(my translation). 
12. 2 PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC I (Dalloz, 7th ed. 2004) (my translation). 
13. ALAINPELLET&PATRICKDAILLIER,DROITINTERNATIONALPUBLIC 35 (L.G.D.J., 7th ed. 2002) (my 
translation). 
14. EMMANUEL DECAUX, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 14 (Dalloz, 4th ed. 2004) (my translation). 
15. DOMINIQUE CARREAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 34 (Pedone, 8th ed. 2004); see also PHILIP 
C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956). 
16. COMBACAU & SUR, supra note 11, at 17. 
17. DAILLIER & PELLET, supra note 13, at x. Lex mercatoria was a system of customary law that 
regulated the dealings of mariners and merchants until the 17th century. It's principles formed the basis of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 893 (7th ed. 1999). 
18. CARREAU, supra note 15, at 34 (my translation). 
19. Id. at 175-98. 
20. DECAUX, supra note 14, at front cover. 
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from the outset, it appears clear that there is no unity in French doctrine, since there 
is not even agreement on the subject of a textbook on international law. 
B. A Common Positivist Methodology 
What do French internationalists think the function of an international law 
textbook should be? Should it simply explain existing rules in the most neutral, 
scientific way possible? Or should it also take a stand, denounce weaknesses in the 
system as described, and suggest improvements? 
French doctrine was divided on this point as early as the period between the two 
World Wars. Some of those who were doctrinally close to positivism considered that 
the role of the jurist is simply to present the current state of the rules in the most 
impersonal manner possible. Others, on the contrary, following the natural law 
tradition, wished to go beyond description to denounce the unjust effects of some rules. 
Thus, for example, Edmond Giraud, a representative of the positivist perspective, 
claimed that ''the role of the professor is essentially to make an exact, true and clear 
statement of positive law, whatever his opinion of that law."21 On the other hand, 
Lou.is Le Fur considered that both legal good and evil exist and legal neutrality would 
be s~cial abdication, rewarding injustice and violence. 22 Much later, Michel Virally 
would similarly claim that "[t)he analysis of positive law appears impracticable 
without an appreciation of the justice or injustice of its provisions. ,m 
At first glance, a study of current French international law textbooks seems to 
demonstrate that this quarrel has calmed and that the search for neutrality dominates 
most of them. Does this mean that positivism has won this battle? Yes, as long as a 
distinction is made, as suggested by Norberto Bobbio, between positivism as a "means 
21. Edmund Giraud, Le droit positif. Ses rapports avec la philosophie et la politique, in MELANGES 
BASDEVANT 222 (1960). Of course, Hans Kelsen's position on this subject is well known, affmning that 
"legal science should not evaluate or judge, but rather provide a description unsullied by any values." Hans 
Kelsen, Theorie du droit international public, 84 RECUEIL DES CoURS I, 8 (1953). Kelsen (1881- I 973) was 
an Austrian, subsequent U.S. national, and professor (Universities of Vienna, Cologne, Geneva, Harvard, 
and Berkeley). His principal contributions to international law were Peace through law (1944), The Law 
of the United Nations ( 1950), and Principles of international law ( 1952). Kelsen, who remains better known 
and more influential on continental Europe applied something like Kant's Transcendental Argument to law. 
The nonnative theory ofKelsen considers law as being made up ofa series ofnonns, ultimately deriving 
their validity from a basic norm (Grund norm), and this basic norm is in turn presupposed by those seeing 
legal order as nonnative. As a legal positivist, Kelsen does not mean to ground the normative force of his 
basic norm on its moral validity, but makes his theory pure of sociological, moral, or practice-based 
elements. 
22. Louis Le Fur, La theorie du droit nature/ depuis le XVIle siecle et la doctrine moderne, 18 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 259, 385 ( I 927). 
23. MICHEL VIRALLY, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN DEVENIR 67 (1990) (my translation). See also 
Hersch Lauterpacht, Reg/es genera/es du droit de la paix, 62 RECUEIL DES CoURS 95, 177-82 (1937). 
Hersch Lauterpacht's description of the tasks and problems of the science of international law includes the 
critical examination of the reality of international obligations flowing from treaties and the adaptation of 
traditional notions of international law to reflect progress in other areas of the law. 
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of approaching legal studies" and positivism as a theory or as an ideology. 24 Indeed, 
a positivist approach is recognized by the main international law textbooks. 
Thus, Jean Combacau and Serge Sur acknowledge that their textbook "follows a 
doctrinal continuum, that of legal positivism . . . . Just like the most rigorous internal 
disciplines, international law is based on a technique. This work follows that techni-
que because it best explains the concrete role oflaw in international practice .... "25 
For his part, Pierre-Marie Dupuy uses a "scientifically positive" approach, extolling 
methodological positivism, "analyzing the international legal phenomenon, including 
its most contemporary aspects, such as it is," which the author summarizes as "well 
tempered scientific positivism." 26 The textbook by Alain Pellet and Patrick Daillier 
participates in the rebirth of a form of positivism without dogmatic voluntarism, a 
pragmatic positivism describing the state of positive law through a systematic 
examination of all sources, case law as well as diplomatic practice. 27 Methodological 
positivism is extolled in the name ofrefusing an ideological approach to law. Thus, 
for example, Jean Combacau and Serge Sur denounce the fact that "international law 
has often been the object of approaches that relate more to discourse about the law than 
to a study of the law itself." 28 For their part, Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet reject 
the "legal militancy" of some textbooks, which aim to turn international law doctrine 
into an instrument of political action, 29 whereas Pierre-Marie Dupuy states his intention 
to describe the law "such as it is and not such as one may want it to be. "30 
This common intention to describe the law such as it is actually practiced is 
clearly perceptible in the analysis of the relations between international and national 
law. Indeed, the quarrel between monism and dualism seems to have lost the force and 
dogmatism it showed in the period between the two World Wars. The positions taken 
currently are more subtle. Even Alain Pellet and Patrick Daillier, who expressly 
defend the monist concept of the pre-eminence of international law, acknowledge the 
fact that in practice the two doctrines often lead to similar results, dualist countries 
agreeing that international law is "part of the law of the land," and monist countries 
requiring procedures for the introduction of international rules into internal law.31 
Emmanuel Decaux sees the monism/dualism quarrel as "Manichean" and "generally 
outdated. "32 
24. Norberto Bobbio (1909-2004) was Italy's leading legal and political philosopher (THE 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL TuRN IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL PIDLOSOPHY (I 934), THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL 
LOGIC (1938), A THEORY OF JUDICIAL NORMS (1958)). He elaborated a general theory of the practice and 
validity of law and regarded the Kelsenian theory as missing the institutional context of law making. Law 
and rights are conceived as a historical achievement belonging to a particular form of State. Bobbio 
distinguishes three main senses of legal positivism: as a value free approach to law, as a legalistic theory 
of law and State, and as an ideology of justice affirming the duty to obey the law as such. See NORBERTO 
BOBB IO, IL POSITIVISMO GIURIDICO (1996). 
25. COMBACAU & SUR, supra note 11, at v (my translation). 
26. DUPUY, supra note 12, at 396,362 (my translation). 
27. PELLET & DAILLIER, supra note 13, at 78, 80. 
28. COMBACAU & SUR, supra note 11, at v (my translation). 
29. PELLET & DAILLIER, supra note 13, at 81. 
30. DUPUY, supra note 12, at 396 (my translation). 
31. PELLET & DAILLIER, supra note 13, at 95. 
32. DECAUX, supra note 14, at 67. 
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Pierre-Marie Dupuy lists the limits of each theory taken in isolation and notes that 
in theory, these relations are established largely on internal constitutional options 
adopted by each State and, in practice, on the interpretation adopted by their courts. 33 
The same observation is made by Combacau and Sur, leading them to the conclusion 
that the monist option "is just a deviation, or even a modality of dualism. "34 Therefore, 
the study of practice is fundamental and testifies to a realistic, neutral approach to the 
law. Nevertheless, although the analysis of practice is similar and, in this case, leads 
to the common observation that state constitutions offer a variety of solutions, the 
theoretical consequences drawn by some authors are more diverse: the need for 
monism claimed by Daillier and Pellet, the inevitability of dualism according to 
Combacau and Sur. 
This shows the difficulty, if not impossibility, of a totally neutral, scientific 
approach to the law, given that it is not a precise science, admitting various interpreta-
tions and divergent practices. In addition, subjectivity is reintroduced in the textbooks 
due to the practical need to make a selection among all the data collected, developing 
some areas at the expense of others. Emmanuel Decaux admits this quite simply: 
"[W]e have sought to bring out the essential elements, by insisting subjectively on a 
number of major aspects that help to situate current issues in international law."35 
C. The Problem of the Scope of Analysis 
In reality, the interpretation of objective data taken from practice inevitably passes 
through the filter of the preconceived ideas that different authors have of the matter, 
its limits and even its object, aims, and underlying nature. Michel Virally had already 
issued a warning on this subject: "One does not seek to establish what the law is, but 
what it should be, based on philosophical, methodological or even ideological 
predispositions." 36 These substantive problems appear right from the start of the 
analysis, when delimiting the scope of the relevant elements to be taken into account 
during the study. Thus, different responses will be given to the question whether it is 
necessary to include a consideration of the origins and aims oflaw in a description of 
the legal phenomenon. 
From a scientific viewpoint, one may be tempted to reply in the negative, because 
these questions are likely to be influenced by the moral or religious convictions of the 
authors. They introduce the study of values into the description of the law-values 
that suffer from their relativity. Yet, if one prudently excludes these questions, the 
resulting description may be incomplete, only describing the visible aspects of the 
legal phenomenon. Thus, despite the same concern for realistic description of the law, 
a postulate common to all authors, the responses may vary greatly, which explains the 
diversity of French textbooks in this regard. 
For Jean Combacau and Serge Sur, the search for scientific neutrality implies a 
strictly technical approach to the law.37 Yet this is seen as insufficient by Patrick 
33. DUPUY, supra note 12, at 407. 
34. COMBACAU & SUR, supra note 11, at 181 (my translation). 
35. DECAUX, supra note 14, at I (my translation). 
36. VIRALLY, supra note 23, at 31 (my translation). 
37. COMBACAU & SUR, supra note 11, at V. 
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Daillier and Alain Pellet, who attempt to avoid "dogmatism" so as to remain in contact 
with the realities of international life.38 The technical approach must, therefore, be 
complemented by a study of the social context. Pierre-Marie Dupuy also notes that, 
from his perspective, it is not very scientific to exclude the social and historical 
context, such as the finality of a rule, which allows reintroduction into the analysis of 
considerations of justice or social necessity, at least when they are directly deduced 
from the rule.39 He writes that "truly sociological data ... cannot be irrelevant to legal 
analysis, if only because it has a direct impact on the technical aspects of the law. 
Thus, the integration of an analysis of such data does not mean taking an ideological 
approach or taking one's desires for reality.',4() 
The last two approaches are in direct opposition to Kelsen's affirmation that: 
[Pure theory] does not discount the fact that the content of all legal systems is 
determined by historical, economic, moral and political factors, but .... [I]t leaves 
it to the political, economic and historical sciences ... to explain why a particular 
positive legal system has a particular content and not another .... Indeed, the 
knowledge of positive law is based on other principles than the knowledge of 
historical and economic facts, or moral and political values .... 41 
On the contrary, these definitions hark back directly to the preoccupations of the theory 
of sociological objectivism, in their attempt to bring to light the substantive sources of 
law constituted by social necessity. That the majority of French doctrine should be 
favorable to this approach is not surprising given the heritage left by the philosophy 
of Georges Scelle42 and Maurice Bourquin. 43 These differences in the scope of 
analysis are not without effects and lead to important differences concerning the very 
nature of international law. 
III. OPPOSING CONCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Although not as vigorous or radical as the doctrinal disagreements during the 
period between the two World Wars, the differences identified above are linked to the 
objectivist versus voluntarist debate concerning the origin of international law and the 
analogy with national law. 
38. PELLET & DAJLLIER, supra note 13, at 77-78. 
39. DUPUY, supra note 12, at IO. 
40. Id. at 356 (my translation). 
41. Kelsen, supra note 21, at 7 (my translation). 
42. Georges Scelle (1878-1961), French public servant and professor (Dijon and Geneva). Principal 
works: LE PACTE DES NATIONS ET SA LIAISON A VEC LES TRAITES DE PAIX ( I 919); PRECIS DE DROIT DES GENS 
(1932 and 1934), 'fHEORIE ET PRATIQUE DE LA FONCTION EXECUTIVE N DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1936). 
Scelle's theory emphasized the material sources of international law, especially social necessity, and 
predicted the growth of federalism as the inevitable consequence of the interdependence of nations. For 
Scelle, the international world was already a society and possessed a hierarchical constitution. 
43. Maurice Bourquin (1884-1961), born in Toumai, Belgium, a professor (Geneva), and diplomat at 
the Societe des nations (League of Nations). Bourquin analysed law as a product of social life and 
emphazised the interdependence of nations, but his doctrine is less dogmatic and systematic than Scelle's. 
See generally Maurice Bourquin, Academie de droit international, in 35 RECUEIL DES COURS ( 193 I). 
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A. A Persistent Cleavage Between Positivism and Objectivism 
The issue here is the conceptual framework through which the data collected will 
be filtered and analyzed. Their classification, explanation, and the identification of 
their meaning are based on theoretical predispositions that appear clearly in all the 
textbooks considered. This is true of the voluntarist positivism in the textbook by 
Jean Combacau and Serge Sur. Significantly, chapter two is entitled: "The origin of 
international law: international commitment by the State." The authors explain that 
''the criterion for the existence of a rule of international law resides ultimately in a 
commitment by States with respect to it and the international obligations of each State 
by virtue of its own commitment. This is the basis of all international law.''44 The 
issue of origins having been so clearly resolved, questions regarding the social and 
historical context become irrelevant, at least in the context of legal analysis, and the 
strictly technical approach recommended by the authors is thus the most legally 
relevant solution. On the contrary, the importance of the will of the state in the 
creation of international law is minimized in Alain Pellet and Patrick Daillier's 
textbook, which criticizes voluntarism for not taking account of the social context in 
which law is formed. They note that, in reality, "a State that expresses its will acts 
under the pressure of a specific economic and political necessity and within a given 
social context.'>45 
This explains the primary importance, recognized by these authors, of describing 
sociological aspects. Developments concerning the social context underlying the 
elaboration of a rule thus respond to a logical need. Accordingly, this is the textbook 
that most clearly integrates the French heritage of sociological objectivism identified 
by Georges Scelle46 that sees law as the fruit of social necessity, the state simply 
observing the objective, prior existence of the rule. The role of the state is thus 
reduced to the simple function ofrecording the law. Although the authors' approach 
is less systematic and dogmatic in this case, it is nevertheless directly influenced by 
the "Scellian" philosophy. 47 
Finally, Pierre-Marie Dupuy's textbook, while recognizing the essential role of 
consent, argues that it is no longer possible ''to continue interpreting the most recent 
means of rule creation ... using the conceptual framework that was used at the time 
of the Lotus case.'>48 The author rejects, therefore, a strict voluntarist approach. In 
practice, this textbook pays great attention to the social context of rule-making, which 
is similar to the approach of sociological objectivism. It also attempts to study 
normative goals, noting in particular that it appears "absolutely fundamental not to 
forget that the United Nations Charter ... assigns specific goals to international society 
as a whole.'>49 This attention to the aims of the rule, which may also be found in the 
44. COMBACAU & SUR, supra note 11, at 47 (my translation). 
45. PELLET & DAILLIER, supra note 13, at 103 (my translation). 
46. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
47. The authors do, however, keep a certain distance from Scelle and criticize his rejection of the 
concept of sovereignty, which they regard as contradicted by the reality of international society. PELLET & 
DAILLIER, supra note 13, at 106. 
48. DUPUY, supra note 12, at 395 (my translation). 
49. Id. at 356-57. In the Lotus case, S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), 
the Permanent Court of International Justice decided whether Turkey could exercise criminal jurisdiction 
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work of Dominique Carreau and Emmanuel Decaux, brings the author close to the 
natural law movement, although in a non-dogmatic way and attentive to the realities 
of international life, as extolled by Charles de Visscher, who relied on "human goals, 
the basis of the international order," as "the ultimate reasons for the legal rule." 50 
B. International Law: Primitive Law Still Being Perfected 
or a Different Sort of Law? 
In the final analysis, these differences concerning the scope of international law 
explain the divergence between the authors. Indeed, they provide radically differing 
replies to the following question: Is current international law still at a sort of primitive, 
imperfect stage, requiring reliance on the centralized, state models to continue 
improving, or, alternatively, does it have its own specific irreducible nature and 
characteristics that render it impossible to compare the two systems? This comes 
down to asking whether the international system will continue to apply the system 
inherited from the Westphalian treaties, based on the sovereign state as the sole or 
dominant subject of international law. Is its underlying principle a simple law of 
coexistence between equal sovereignties or has it become an essentially cooperative 
form of law, perhaps even the law of an emerging international community that will 
eventually become centralized in the image of its constituent states? 
The textbook by Jean Combacau and Serge Sur is clearly centered on the 
permanence and dominant presence of the state. This appears in the preface, which 
states that the book "is, above all, attentive to international law as produced and 
applied by States, which are both its source and essentials subjects." 51 This is in no 
way reduced by the emergence of international organizations which, except for the 
specific case of the European Union, result from a "static interstate approach" 52 and 
have not become real players alongside their member states. They are thus treated as 
"second level subjects, fundamentally subordinate to their creators. "53 The expression · 
"international community" is rarely used by these authors and always between inverted 
commas, since it lacks the political homogeneity ''that would justify giving it an 
institutional organization separate from that ofStates." 54 
Beyond the absence of any institutional community, the authors also insist on the 
weakness of the normative community. This explains their rather skeptical analysis 
of jus co gens, seen as the fruit of a bygone epoch during which both new and socialist 
over a French sea captain who collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas. Id. at 5. The court concluded 
that no provisions of international law prohibited such jurisdiction and thus it was permissible. Id. at 30. 
In a brief dictum, the court explained, "[t]he rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their 
own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted .... Restrictions upon the 
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed." Id. at 18. The Lotus case is a significant example 
of a voluntarist conception of international law. For some authors, this conception of international law is 
still relevant. 
50. CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORIES ET REALITES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 153 ( 4th ed. 1970). 
See also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The European Tradition in International Law: Charles de Visscher, 11 EUR. 
J. INT'L L. 871,873 (2000). 
51. COMBACAU & SUR, supra note 11, at v. 
52. Id. at 705. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 7 (my translation). 
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states influenced the content of international law. The nature and real meaning ofjus 
cogens were never clarified and its influence on international practice is questioned.55 
Similarly, the concept of an "international public order" is treated as a militant view 
of international law that is far from being shared unanimously. This opinion is 
developed during the study of collective countermeasures and the concept of 
international crime. 56 This classic, Westphalian vision of international law emphasizes 
its permanent aspects. The changes during the last few decades are thus seen as 
quantitative rather than qualitative. International society is decentralized by nature and 
has no reason to align itself on the centralized state model. The introduction of 
concepts such as ''public order" or even, to a certain extent, the distinction between 
civil and criminal law, is thus perceived as a perturbation because it counters a proved, 
secular logic. 
Adopting a nuanced dialectic approach, Pierre-Marie Dupuy traces the evolution 
of international law, but also recognizes the contradictions which affect it. He 
summarizes this tension as ''the relative progress ofinternational law."57 Although the 
"pre-eminence" of states is recognized, the author also insists on the "constants and 
evolution of international law," which: 
is still the law of coexistence between equal sovereignties, contributing to the 
adjustment of their respective competence and competing pretensions. It equally 
maintains to be the law of cooperation in a range of areas in constant expansion. 
Finally, it is the law of the international community and Humanity, whose interests 
it will be required to protect in the nascent century, or even guarantee their Survival. 58 
This even-handed vision is perceptible in Pierre-Marie Dupuy's study ofinternational 
organizations. The author recognizes that, in many respects, they remain in strict 
dependence on states. He also notes, however, that through the dynamics of their 
operation, international organizations are forced to escape the tutelage of their 
members59 and thus acquire legal autonomy, eventually ending up "face to face with 
States.''6° The theme of the "international community" is also analyzed as being one 
of the "major axes of contemporary international law."61 Although the ideological 
connotations of the concept are recognized, the author demonstrates that it still has a 
normative impact leading to an international public order. Nevertheless, he observes 
that its effectiveness is limited by the absence of institutional centralization. 62 Human 
rights and the issue of individual legal personality are considered to be one of the 
major phenomena of contemporary international law, which "has probably displaced 
the centre of gravity of the entire international legal system, even though this remained 
imperceptible at first.''63 This vision is far from being static, or supportive of the 
separate, inherently interstate nature of international law. It clearly shows the 
55. Id. at 159. 
56. Id at 215. 
57. DUPUY, supra note 12, at 102 (emphasis omitted). 
58. Id at 23 (my translation). 
59. Id. at 146. 
60. Id. at 170. 
61. Id. at 389. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 26 (my translation). 
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dynamism of the system, although this dynamism is seen as challenged and its results 
uncertain. There is no dogmatism, therefore, but no principled solution either. 
Emmanuel Decaux notes a rupture with classic international law and points out 
the dynamics of an international order searching for justice and peace. He defines 
three stages in the evolution of international law in which contemporary international 
law is placed under the sign of globalization, 64 that of an international society ''yet to 
be" requiring a ''world organization above States.''65 This implies an ultimate stage of 
evolution that does not go as far as envisaging a "superstate," but at least a high level 
of centralization. Dominique Carreau's textbook also presents a dynamic perspective 
on international law, the evolution of which seems to have accelerated since 1945. 
The author stigmatizes old-fashioned, obsolete concepts of international law, which 
are undergoing both horizontal and vertical transformation, integrating new actors and 
new areas. This does not prevent the author, when comparing national and 
international law, from noting that the latter is still marked by its inferiority and 
weakness, especially in the domain of execution and control, and that it has serious 
failings. 66 This textbook undoubtedly pushes furthest the comparison with national 
law, taken as a paradigm. 
Conversely, the Daillier-Pellet textbook places particular emphasis on the theme 
of the international community. In fact, it is the title of the second section, which 
underlines the progressive recognition of a certain legal personality of the international 
community. 67 In particular, the authors note that the community does not yet enjoy the 
capacity to exercise its rights directly. Accordingly, it is characterized as a minor 
subject of international law.68 The creation of jus cogens, "a considerable legal 
event," 69 is proof for the authors of the existence of an international public order. On 
this subject, the authors assert that "[i]n establishing the written constitutional bases 
of the international community, you have to start somewhere and this occurred with 
the principle [ofjus cogens] adopted in the [Vienna] Convention.'' 70 This evolution 
may still be far from complete, yet the dynamics of the international order and the 
irresistible attraction of the national model are palpable, with the temptation to 
organize international society along the lines of a superstate with its own constitution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Law of a naturally quasi-anarchic decentralized society, law of a society in full 
mutation and affected by contradictory tensions, or even law of an emerging 
international community? These are the fundamental fractures revealed by the study 
of French internationalist doctrine through its main textbooks. These fractures can be 
summarized in a few questions: Is the Lotus case view oflaw still relevant today? Is 
it a purely interstate phenomenon based on consent or a product of social life the State 
64. DECAUX, supra note 14, at 309. 
65. Id. at 14. 
66. CARREAU, supra note 15, at 36. 
67. PELLET & DAILLIER, supra note 13, at 401 (my translation). 
68. Id. at 402. 
69. Id. at 208. 
70. Id. (my translation). 
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can only record? Can one speak of progress in international law toward an inter-
national community? 
The great diversity of answers given to these questions show that there exists no 
"French school" of international law, apart from a common positivist methodology, 
which is at least perhaps what really distinguishes French casebooks from American 
casebooks. The debate about the foundations and goals of international law seems to 
still endure in France. 
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